1 For instance, she considers in some detail the image of 'blindness' towards distinctions between individuals used in Works of Love. Does commending such blindness towards the neighbour endorse 'an abstract relation to another whose distinctiveness is irrelevant and who is effectively interchangeable' (Ferreira 2001: 54) ? The key question is whether the 'particular individuals' of whom she asks' (Ferreira 2001: 74, my emphasis) . (This claim would be more plausible if we substituted 'will' with 'might'.) In other words, I am not being told actually to hate my beloved. Rather, what is being demanded of me is 'being willing, when appropriate, to "seem" as if to hate the other, or being willing, when appropriate, to be hated by the other' (Ferreira 2001: 75) .
Again, Ferreira's interpretation arguably makes Kierkegaard more palatable than the text fully warrants. And even though her Kierkegaard is less extreme than some, she still makes an important concession: 'Perhaps Kierkegaard exaggerates what he calls the "collision" between two conceptions of love, "the divine conception and the merely human conception" (ibid., citing WL 110/SKS 9 114).
Ferreira returns to the problem of 'special relationships' in her discussion of the deliberation 'Love is a matter of conscience'. Her strategy remains the same: to attempt to defend Kierkegaard from the persistent criticism that he gives an inadequate account of such relationships. Ferreira continues to maintain that for Kierkegaard preferential loves are not excluded; it is simply that neighbour-love needs to be preserved at the heart of erotic love and friendship. But once again, her reading of Kierkegaard seems to gloss over some problematic passages.
Ferreira notes the following crucial passage:
'Christianity has not come into the world to teach this or that change in how you are to love your wife and your friend in particular, but to teach how you are to love all human beings universally-humanly. It is in turn this change that Christianly changes erotic love and friendship. She connects this with a slightly later passage:
'Christianity has not changed anything in what people have previously learned about loving the beloveds, the friend, etc., has not added a little or subtracted something, but it has changed everything, has changed love as a whole. Only insofar as a change of inwardness in erotic love and friendship results from this fundamental change, only to that extent has it changed these.' (WL 147/SKS9 148) To the second passage, Kierkegaard immediately adds: 'This it has done by making all love a matter of conscience' (WL 147/SKS9 148).
We might wonder whether this second passage obscures precisely the question at issue. One of the key questions is precisely what difference is made to erotic love and friendship by the idea that the lover or friend is 'first and foremost the neighbour'. So it becomes crucial to ask:
what is this 'change of inwardness' of which Kierkegaard speaks?
Ferreira reads the two passages as follows: 'the only radical change involved is the change of making love, even when it includes erotic love and friendship, a "matter of conscience".' (Ferreira 2001: 90) She explicitly denies that Kierkegaard is requiring us to forgo the 'natural drives and inclinations' (Ferreira 2001 : 90-1) of erotic love and friendship. (Provided, I assume, that they are not inconsistent with central Christian teachings.) But this underlines the importance of her next question. What should we make of 'the admittedly "strange, chilling inversion" by which "in loving the beloved we are first to love the neighbour" (WL 141/SKS9 142)?' (Ferreira 2001: 91) Again, Ferreira seeks to justify Kierkegaard's position here, insisting that 'what it means to say that someone is "first and foremost the neighbour" is that with respect to each person we must consult with our conscience' (Ferreira 2001: 91) . What this turns out to mean is that since the other belongs primarily to God, not ourselves, 'a man can no more take advantage of his wife, because she is his wife, than of another neighbour. We cannot make a sex object out of our wife or husband; we cannot emotionally or physically abuse our spouse because, however intimate and specific the relationship is, each remains a neighbour, an equal before God. The apparent abstractness of the claim, "Each one of us is a human being and then in turn the distinctive individual that he is in particular, but to be a human being is the fundamental category" [WL 141/SKS9 143] is meant to guarantee the fundamental respect appropriate to our equality before God. The "first, then" language is not meant to be taken as a temporal qualifier. There is no instant at which we are only the abstract determinant "human being"; we are always in some kind of special relation, even if it is only the relation of being someone's child.' (Ferreira 2001: 92, my emphasis) Ferreira claims that Kierkegaard's central point is that 'the Christian change in all love' (ibid.) is that love becomes a matter of conscience. Thus although 'Christianity makes a change in erotic love and friendship', this change is simply that it introduces conscience, and thus it does not involve 'preventing them from being erotic love and friendship' (ibid.).
Will this do? As it stands, I don't think so. First, to say that Christianity introduces conscience is to take a quite unfair view of the possibilities of, for instance, pagan friendship.
Indeed, conscience is a significant feature of many accounts of friendship in the ancient world (see Lippitt 2007 'Neighbor love, Kjerlighed, is not a "higher" love that should replace or be added to erotic love and friendship ... the goal is to preserve love for the neighbour in erotic love and friendship. ... Nonpreferential love is to "permeate" all expressions of love -to transform them -yet not in the sense of adding something to them, as if you could love the beloved or friend adequately by yourself' (Ferreira 2001: 94 God', seeing it as the 'hidden ground' of any possible manifestation of love: romantic, as well as neighbourly. Beyond this, she then notes the distinctions, now standard in this literature, between erotic love and friendship ('special loves') as preferential, and neighbourlove as non-preferential, the latter rooted in equality and based on 'self-denial'.
In her subsequent discussion, Krishek implicitly assumes that the opposite of 'self-denial' is selfishness, a term that she doesn't fully unpack. On the back of this, she claims:
Self-sacrifice, it follows, is as much of vice, as much of a sign of inadequate moral development, as selfishness. ' (MacIntyre 1999: 160) In other words, a vital part of proper self-love may involve combining the good for oneself and the good for others in a way that makes talk of 'self-sacrifice', 'self-denial' and egoism versus altruism pretty unhelpful. Sally B. Purvis gives a good example with respect to a mother's love for her baby: 'the mother's need may be to feed the child, comfort her, rock him, etc.' (Purvis 1991: 27) .
What this enables us to see is twofold. First, that Krishek is on to something important: we should not valorise a conception of proper self-love that obliges us to get 'beyond' the selftranscend all its desires -completely. But, second, that the idea of 'self-denial' needs to be treated very carefully.
Qualifying somewhat her earlier remarks, Krishek recognises that the second love commandment itself means that Kierkegaard's position cannot be that 'inclinations and desires and everything connected to the well-being of the self are to be eliminated when one is to love properly (that is, in the neighbourly way)' (Krishek 2009: 114-5) . She goes on to recognise the need 'to distinguish between at least two different ways of relating to the self, between two kinds of self-love: the kind of self-love referred to in the commandment, and the kind of self-love Kierkegaard considers as selfish' (Krishek 2009: 115).
Krishek's subsequent treatment of the problem is an attempt to qualify the position of Ferreira. Krishek agrees with Ferreira on several key points. First, that the distinction we need is between proper and selfish self-love. Second, that proper self-love (the kind that can be 'applied to our relationship to the neighbour') is based on 'respect' and 'wishing the good for ourselves' (ibid.). She also cites approvingly Ferreira's distinction between 'a "selfish", exclusive love of self, which is at odds with the good of the other, and a "proper", inclusive love of the self, which both encompasses the good of the other and is the measure of the good of the other' (Ferreira 2001: 35; cited She then goes on to modify Ferreira's account by distinguishing not two (as Ferreira does) but three kinds of self-love: a) Selfish self-love: self-love which is 'at odds with good of the other': it involves 'using the other as a means for one's selfish satisfactions or acting towards achieving one's own good regardless of the effect it has on the other'.
b) Proper qualified self-love: a 'restricted' form of self-love which is that to which the commandment refers. This is 'understood in terms of respect and wishing one's wellbeing, in a narrow sense of "well-being" (that is, a well-being stripped of most of its "embodied" aspects, such as responsiveness and sensitivity to inclinations, desires and preferences)'.
c) Proper unqualified self-love: 'Acting to fulfil one's well-being, in a broader sense of "well-being" (which includes sensitivity to the self's inclinations, desires and preferences), with a constant consideration of the good of the other. That is, fulfilling one's own "self-focused" concerns so long as they are not "at odds with the good of the other".' (Krishek 2009: 116) Will this give us the distinction that we need? I don't think so the injured man's wounds and pays for his stay at the inn, rather than just -as Ferreira nicely puts it -throwing him 'spiritual reading for his stay in the ditch' (Ferreira 2001: 34) .
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Krishek claims that the ambivalence to preferential love at the heart of Works of Love is largely overlooked in the secondary literature. Citing Sylvia Walsh's concession that Kierkegaard 'does not seem to recognize any ability on the part of natural love to love unselfishly' (Walsh 1988: 248; cited in Krishek 2009: 119) , she rejects as inadequate Walsh's attempt to dissolve the tension by claiming that although we love our significant others 'differently', 'this difference is not essential, since we love them fundamentally as we love others, that is, as a neighbor' (ibid.). Walsh's way of putting this, without any further explanation, does seem to want to have its cake and eat it. Walsh is certainly on to something:
the idea that the beloved must be first and foremost the neighbour. But she claims that such neighbourly love is for Kierkegaard 'the decisive factor in the transformation of erotic love that rids it of selfish exclusivity and establishes equality in love while preserving special relations' (Walsh 1988 : 241, cited in Krishek 2009 This claim has some plausibility provided we stick at this level of abstraction, but far less so if we fill in some details. I am troubled by Krishek's talk of a 'hierarchy' in love, based on preference. Her idea seems to be that that ceteris paribus, I will choose my beloved or friend over a stranger, and that it is normally right and proper so to do. But ceteris paribus But here is the crux of the matter. Krishek claims:
'The result of the demand to love in the same way (in the neighbourly, non-preferential, equal way) all the different objects of love in our lives, then, is that we leave no real room for the (existing) differences between preferential and non-preferential loves.' (Krishek 2009: 124) This does not follow. Kierkegaard is not committed to the claim that we must love identically each of the objects of love in our lives. think, the wrong questions, for reasons I shall now seek to explain.
The God filter
I submit that Kierkegaard's position is not that a love identical in the case of each individual other person should be 'directed equally at everybody'. Rather, part of what is meant by God being the 'middle term' is that 'God' is a kind of filter through which each of our loves needs to be passed. then it has been 'purified' (up to a point) in the sense that it has been stripped of its 'sinful' elements.
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Two caveats are necessary here. First, to say the above is not to deny that our judgements on these matters are always going to be defeasible. Self-deception will remain a constant danger.
What is being commended is the kind of test necessary for any given love to count as (relatively) 'pure': nothing is being claimed about the infallibility of any such test. Relatedly -and this is the second point -I don't mean to imply by a phrase like 'stripped of its sinful elements' that the filter gets rid of original sin. However, even if all human actions and intentions have the taint of original sin, this does not imply that there is no point in asking of some specific relationship whether my reasons for entering it are selfish, self-centred or otherwise problematic.
This model has the significant advantage that with regard to Krishek's objection to Ferreira, there is no reason to suppose that, once it has gone through the filter, any given instance of 'purified' romantic love (or friendship) would be identical to Samaritan-like love of a stranger in need. As we have seen, what worries Krishek is precisely this: that the Kierkegaard of Works of Love is committed to the identity of such loves. Now, the point of the filter is to rid any given manifestation of love of its harmful 'impurities'. But we would not suppose that the 'purified' residue of two different liquids run through a filter would be In other words, to say that Christianity 'recognizes really' only the spirit's love is to say that Christianity is interested above all else in this key common denominator in all commendable manifestations of love. Such love might be found both in my love for my romantic beloved
and my love for a stranger, but this does not imply that the common denominator is all that there is in these manifestations of love. They will be very different in practice and in detail.
My love for my beloved and my love for the homeless stranger -once through the 'filter' -are 'the same' love only (but importantly) in the sense that they are both free of the relevant impurities.
I think Krishek's mistake is to assume that the equality of value on which Kierkegaard insists (since all neighbours are equal before God) implies the need for an equality of treatment which makes it impossible to distinguish my love for my beloved from my love for the stranger. But Kierkegaard, I submit, neither conflates these two kinds of equality nor draws this inference: he is committed to equality of value, but that does not imply that he needs to
The 'You shall love' of the commandment and the very category of the neighbour is given to us in the parts of the first series concerned with clarifying the concepts and scope of the commandment. But according to Ferreira, such clarification of scope is only a preliminary to an increasing focus on concreteness. 14 Perhaps then, supplementing my 'God filter' imagery above, neighbour-love is not only the liquid that 'permeates' other liquids (such as romantic love, friendship and self-love) in their 'purified' form, but is -to switch metaphors -only a 'sketch' until it is brought to fruition in any given manifestation of ('purified') love. And some such manifestations will be examples of romantic love, Krishek's central concern.
This second metaphor (of sketches and fully realised artistic works) is one dimension of the centrality of 'vision' in this deliberation (amongst others). Ferreira suggests: 'probably the most decisive positive discussion of ethics as a kind of seeing is found in this fourth deliberation, where to be ethical is to see the other just as he or she is, in all his or her distinctive concreteness' (Ferreira 2001: 106) . If it is right that this is central to Kierkegaard's overall purpose, then it follows that one's lover cannot just be one's neighbour, and there are further reasons to resist Krishek's objection to the alleged lack of enthusiasm with which Kierkegaard embraces concreteness or 'special' loves.
Ferreira argues that Kierkegaard preserves this concreteness in several ways. First, he urges us to avoid becoming victims of our own fantasies. He urges us to love the person we see, not
'the self-generated image of the other person' (Ferreira 2001: 109) ; 'an imaginary idea of how we think or could wish that this person should be' (WL 164/SKS9 164).
14 Ferreira claims that the tripartite second deliberation constitutes 'law': 'the description of a rule for determining the category "neighbor" -"all" has the force of "no exceptions". The purpose of these chapters is not to delineate the character of a substantive response to the other but to delimit a category by stipulating that no one can be excluded from this category on the basis of difference or dissimilarity ... The analysis of the rule (the sketch or the skeleton) is not meant to give us a complete picture of his view of love.' (Ferreira 2001: 102) .
Second, 'loving the person one sees' does not imply being utterly blind to their faults. Love can be challenging as well as accepting, but it can do this only if it loves the actual person it sees (Ferreira 2001: 110-1 If we focus only on the phrase 'no difference in the love', we could indeed reach Krishek's conclusion. But we need a more careful reading of the whole passage, and I argue that such a reading takes us much closer to Ferreira's position. It seems clear that the intention of the overall passage is that the love described 'makes no distinction' in the sense that it finds everyone to be of intrinsic value. Yet the passage also clearly implies that this love celebrates differences and acts accordingly. (This is Ferreira's point.) If this love is the model for our love, then the point seems to be this. Let us start with the conclusion Ferreira draws: 'genuine human love, emulating divine love, should love the differences and build up differentially, responding to different needs.' (Ferreira 2001: 112-3) This is fine as far as it goes -but we need to say more. The italicised passage -which, interestingly, neither commentator citesdraws our attention to two distinct difficulties. First, that of making no distinctions. This is difficult because of our natural preferences for our beloveds and our friends. of any two manifestations of love in any problematic sense than does Krishek herself, every time she uses the phrase 'romantic love'. It would be unfairly harsh to charge Krishek with the view that because she brings two different manifestations of love -Sue's love for her husband; Bill's for his wife -under the same heading (romantic love) that she is therefore claiming that these two manifestations of love are metaphysically identical. Clearly they are not. These two manifestations of love do not possess numerical identity, like George Orwell and Eric Blair. Nor are they even qualitatively identical, as if they were two carbon atoms in different substances. They are 'the same' only in the sense that they have significant common features. On my 'God filter' view, both Bill's love for his wife and Sue's for her husband are manifestations of love both of which contain components -if 'purified' -of both neighbour love and romantic love. But the main point of the above passage is precisely that each distinct manifestation of love is importantly different from others, notwithstanding the various features they may share. Nevertheless, it is not thereby unreasonable, in common parlance, to call our two instances of love 'romantic love'. Why, then, does Krishek assume that Kierkegaard should be criticised for implying 'sameness' in a similarly weak sense when he claims that Christianity recognizes 'only one kind of love', which as we have argued means, in this context, simply that neighbour love should permeate all manifestations of love?
Consider the following analogy. Suppose a guest wants a mixture of grapefruit juice and orange juice, but does not like the 'bits' contained in the only cartons of such juice that I have. I can get rid of the 'impurities' by passing both juices through an appropriate filter.
Both the grapefruit juice (neighbour love) and the orange juice (romantic love) will make it through the filter; both will be contained in the liquid in its 'purified' form (a specific manifestation of romantic love in which the beloved is simultaneously viewed as my neighbour). Krishek is held captive by the picture that romantic love and neighbour love are more like oil and water than these two juices: she cannot seem to see how the one can permeate the other. To push the liquid analogy a bit further, this seems to be because she is worried that neighbour love 'dilutes' romantic love. But as far as I can see, she has provided no compelling reason to support this assumption. Moreover, in further support of an alternative picture, we can draw on a point made by Patrick Stokes. In line with those critics who are concerned about 'the neighbour' just being an abstract category, Stokes acknowledges that 'the ideal needs the concrete for authentic moral concern to be possible' (Stokes 2010: 140) . He notes the concern of Kierkegaard's Anti-Climacus about 'fantastic feeling' becoming 'a kind of abstract sentimentality that inhumanly belongs to no human being, but inhumanly, so to speak, sentimentally participates in the fate of one or another abstraction, for example, humanity in abstracto' (Kierkegaard 1980: 31 (translation slightly amended)/SKS11 147). In other words, sympathy with, say, 'the poor' -an amorphous abstraction -is 'not directed at persons ... but only at the idea of persons' (Stokes 2010: 139).
